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Preface
There are a great number of surveys in existence that 
demonstrate the rise in information security breaches, 
their associated costs and current practices. These 
include, but are not limited to, the DTI Information 
Security Breaches Surveys (see, for example, [1,2,3, 
4], and the ninth and most recent survey [5] , surveys 
from the Ponemon Institute (see, for example [6], [7], 
[8] and [9]), and surveys from the European Network 
and Information Security Agency (ENISA) such as the 
Current Practice and the Measurement of Success 
report of July 2007 [10]. This latter report features the 
data reported by 67 companies across Europe with 
only 12 being interviewed in depth.
However, some of the problems of using surveys as a 
reliable source are obvious. Most notable is that when 
using self-reporting, there are a number of factors 
that influence the level of accuracy in the data that 
a company reports. This, combined with the fact that 
the data presented is that reported by a sample of 
companies, leads to disclaimers regarding the use of 
the data and subsequent inferences. It certainly would 
 
seem to contradict modern understanding of business 
when the 2008 Information Security Breaches Survey 
published by the Department for Business, Enterprise 
& Regulatory Reform [11] states in its preface that it “is 
encouraging to see that information security incidents 
are causing less disruption to companies’ operations 
than two years ago.” It is fully understandable that 
some businesses will simply not wish to go on record 
stating the accurate size or cost of a breach unless 
legislation forces them to. Equally, there may be 
companies that are simply unable to calculate the size 
or cost of a breach.
This report, rather than relying on questionnaires and 
self-reporting, concerns cases that were investigated 
by the forensic investigation team at 7Safe. Whilst 
removing any inaccuracies arising from self-reporting, 
the authors acknowledge that the limitation of the 
sample size remains. It is hoped that the unbiased 
reporting by independent investigators has yielded 
interesting facts about modern security breaches.
Published January 2010
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This report may be downloaded in electronic format from  
www.7safe.com/breach_report
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IntroductIon
Introduction
The way businesses operate has changed drastically 
with time. Continually striving for leaner, more 
efficient and timely services, they have embraced 
a number of innovations in process and technology. 
From refining processes in industry, to automation, 
to service delivery, businesses strive for ways to 
maximise revenue and minimise cost. 
In more recent times however there has been an 
increased focus on customer service. Providing 
tailored solutions at a cost effective price has 
become the mantra rather than one-size fits all ethos 
of the early and mid twentieth century. As such, we 
are clearly in an era where information is the key for 
businesses to thrive; never before has information 
been so important. However, with the digitisation of so 
much information, so comes the ease of transmission 
and also theft, loss and leakage. In a recent survey 
84% of organisations surveyed suffered at least one 
data breach in a 12 month period between 2007 and 
2008; 44% suffered between 2 and 5 breaches [8].
The proliferation of electronic systems and ubiquity 
of access to the information they hold has given 
rise to increased opportunity for the criminally 
minded. A term of science fiction films twenty years 
ago, cybercrime is now a very real threat facing 
businesses.
There are a number of definitions for the term 
cybercrime and these typically differ in their 
acknowledgement of the breadth of crime that can 
be included under the term cybercrime. 
The European Committee on Crime Problems of the 
Council of Europe [12], building on earlier work of the 
OECD [13], produced a set of guidelines that listed 
 
 
activities that should be considered criminal acts. The 
committee stopped short of a formal definition, opting 
rather to discuss activities that should be considered 
and thus allowing individual countries to adapt 
the functional classification to formulate tailored 
legislation in keeping with their own experience, 
preference and existing legal system. Others widen 
the definition to include such acts as fraud and child 
pornography. The United Nations Manual on the 
Prevention and Control of Computer Related Crime 
[14] states that cybercrime “can involve criminal 
activities that are traditional in nature, such as theft, 
fraud, forgery and mischief, all of which are generally 
subject everywhere to criminal sanctions.” 
We present a definition for cybercrime that is based 
upon experience and the work discussed in the 
paragraph above. We recognise that this definition 
may differ from others and do not claim this to be 
more exact than any other. Rather, in keeping with the 
observation of the UN [14] which states definitions 
“have been produced [that] tend to relate to the study 
for which they were written”, we present a definition 
that is pertinent to this work, and anticipated future 
work. It is for this reason we choose a very loose 
all-encompassing definition.
1
defInIng cybercrIme
Defining Cybercrime
An act of cybercrime is any act which relies 
significantly or entirely on the use of one or more 
computers and gives rise to a result that is, or has 
a traditional counterpart that would be, subject to 
criminal sanction.
The above definition therefore covers all legislated 
computer crime, as well as cases in which computers 
are used in a significant manner, to commit any 
crime.
In its early history cybercrime was largely perceived as 
being undertaken by covert small groups or individuals 
driven by a sense of boredom or academic curiosity. 
Some of the earliest known hackers were the 414s, 
a group that gained notoriety in the early 1980s by 
breaking into high-profile computer systems. When 
eventually caught, the group’s spokesman announced 
that the motivation behind what they had done was 
purely the challenge. 
Times have changed however, and there has been 
a growth in cybercrime for a variety of reasons 
ranging from vandalism, through peer-group respect 
to political motivation. The most significant rise, and 
largest reason for the activity today, however, is for 
financial gain. As such, companies in sectors that 
rely on data that can be easily used for financial gain 
are particularly susceptible. We must acknowledge 
that while it is obvious that cybercrime is increasing 
year on year, the actual reported figures in any 
year are unlikely to be accurate. The 2009 UK 
Cybercrime report by Garlik [15] states very early in 
its proceedings that “official statistics will not reflect 
the true volume of cybercrime being committed”. 
 
 
Given the massive rate of adoption of electronic and 
web-based information systems, it is unsurprising 
that there is an ever-increasing occurrence of illegal 
electronic action. However it should be noted that 
it is not only credit card data that is of financial 
significance to companies and potential attackers. 
Intellectual property is often digitised and can have 
huge value. There has been a rise in electronic 
espionage and the threat is now affecting more 
companies than it did previously. E-espionage can be 
defined as “unauthorised and usually criminal access 
to confidential systems or information for the purposes 
of gaining commercial or political advantage” [16]. 
MI5 states that intelligence services “are targeting 
commercial enterprises far more than in the past.” 
(http://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/espionage.html) 
One of the greatest targets for attackers (particularly 
opportunistic hackers) is that of payment card data. 
The value of records of payment card data may 
have fallen, but the search for such records has not 
diminished. If it is a relatively easy task to acquire 
500,000 credit card records (not at all an unusual 
number to be held on a system) then a business case 
for a criminal may well hold.
A crime closely associated with the theft and 
fraudulent use of payment card details, identity theft, 
is a significant problem that does not seem to be 
abating. It would appear that criminals are developing 
their skills and techniques more rapidly than security 
engineers and enforcement officers. 
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About this Report
There has been a great deal of interest in data security 
breaches in recent years and this interest has led to a 
large number of surveys, most notably the series of nine 
DTI Information Security Breaches Surveys (the most 
recent report being published in 2008 [5]. 
Whilst the information garnered from such reports is 
very useful, and indeed can be used to form a business 
case for information security budget increases, the 
problems with such surveys are well documented. The 
foremost important problem is that at best there is lack 
of confidence in the accuracy, if indeed the data is 
accurate. 
The aim of this report is not to comment on a recent 
study, but actual forensic analysis of data breaches. This 
work analyses 62 genuine cases of breaches investigated 
over a period of 18 months. These investigations have 
been conducted by the digital forensics team at 7Safe. 
The breaches vary in many ways, including the sector 
they belong to, the number of records at risk and the 
sophistication of the attack. This report presents statistics 
on the investigations and discusses the data to provide a 
greater understanding of underlying trends.
For any crime we would like to know the “who, where, 
when, what, how.” In terms of ensuring that justice is 
served to the person responsible for a crime, the “who” 
is obviously critical. However, finding out who committed 
a crime is more important than just to ensure they 
receive the appropriate punishment as a penalty for the 
crime or to satisfy a victim in some form of revenge. By 
demonstrating the ability to determine who perpetrated 
an attack and then punishing appropriately, we can deter 
future potential attackers from committing a crime.
Determining where a crime was committed is useful 
even in electronic crime situations. Information on the 
geographical location of the origin of a cybercrime can 
assist in determining the laws to which that individual 
should be subject to. It can also provide information to 
help ensure that the number of future attacks can be 
reduced, or that the effect of future attacks is diminished, 
by undertaking appropriate preventative action.
Working out when a crime was committed is important 
for a number of reasons, not least of all because it can 
both assist in the identification of the attacker, but also 
without this information it is very difficult to successfully 
prosecute a criminal. It is also important because 
knowing the time of the attack can allow investigators to 
determine the state of the system at the time. It may be 
that since the initial breach was started the system has 
been patched and is now not vulnerable to that attack.
Ascertaining what has been compromised is a non-
trivial matter, as the business of analysing cybercrime 
can prove to be a difficult undertaking. The Garlik UK 
Cybercrime Report [15] states “quantifying cybercrime 
is an imprecise activity”. A recent report on E-espionage 
also comments that the “lack of specific management 
information about the number, nature and source of 
breaches is a worrying finding.” [16] 
The problem has even been made aware to the 
Government and the House of Lords Science and 
Technology Committee recently commented:
  “The availability of comprehensive and reliable data 
about e-crime - the scale of the problem, the risks to the 
public and the costs to the economy - is fundamental to 
developing an effective response to the problem 
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of e-crime and to promoting public confidence in the 
Internet. We urge the Government to implement proposals 
in response to our recommendation on data collection 
and data classification without further delay.” [17]
One of the important roles of a forensic investigator is 
to determine how a compromise was achieved. This 
is pivotal to the containment of the problem, and will 
also help identify the data that has been compromised. 
Analysis of how a breach occurred will allow information 
security strategists to decide how to prevent further 
breaches occurring through the same vulnerability.
It is important to reiterate that any statistics for cybercrime 
are fallible and will only provide details of that particular 
sample. There can be no assumption that the statistics 
can necessarily be extrapolated to make a judgement 
about a national or international landscape. The 
statistics presented are based on the 62 reported cases 
undertaken by the 7Safe forensic investigation team. The 
value of the information will vary from reader to reader, 
but we believe there are a number of insightful details 
that have been brought to light through the report.
It is imperative to understand the importance and value 
7Safe holds for its clients and the protection of their 
data. 7Safe is committed to maintaining both the privacy 
and the anonymity of its clients. As such, all data used 
for analysis was sanitised and client names removed 
from records. The data contains no information that 
would allow the client’s identity to be derived. Equally, 
the method of presentation of statistics within this 
report is in such a way so as to ensure that it cannot be 
individualised to gain information about any client; the 
data presented is always in an aggregate format. 
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The Study Data
The data used in this study is taken from genuine, 
sanitised information taken from real investigations by 
the forensic analysis team at 7Safe. The data covers 
companies from a range of business sectors including 
the financial, sport and retail sectors. Data security 
breaches can be seen to affect organisations across 
a wide range and no particular industry that utilises 
electronic systems can claim to be exempt from threat. 
It has, of course, been recognised that the risk a 
company faces is dependent upon a number of factors. 
In particular, the sector in which an organisation operates 
is known, and for obvious reasons to impact upon both 
the level of threat it faces and the nature of the attack 
vector. On 19th March 2008, the British Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown presented the Government’s new National 
Security Strategy to the House of Commons. This was 
followed in August 2008 by the National Risk Register, 
a component of this strategy released by the Cabinet 
Office. It provides an official Government assessment 
of significant potential risks to the United Kingdom and 
divides risks into three main categories: natural events, 
major accidents and malicious attacks. It evaluates risks 
and rates them by relative impact and relative likelihood. 
The National Risk Register states that “The risk and 
impact of electronic attacks on IT and communication 
systems varies greatly according to the particular sectors 
affected and the source of the threat.” [18].
The sector details of the cases investigated by 7Safe and 
featured in this study can be seen in figure 1.
Figure 1 shows quite clearly the dominance of the retail 
sector in this study, which is not uncommon to other 
studies and surveys concerning data breaches. This is 
not surprising and is likely to be a feature of all studies 
 
concerning non-sector specific breach investigations, 
though perhaps the proportion of those in the retail 
sector may not be quite as high as in this particular 
study in which the vast majority of the attacks were on 
organisations in the retail sector. 
The retail sector often keeps data regarding a large 
number of credit card transactions that can then be 
used for cardholder not present (CNP) transactions. It 
is therefore one of the major reasons that the sector is 
targeted for financial gain.
The Association for Payment Clearing Services, APACS, 
was the trade organisation for the co-operative activity of 
banks, building societies and card issuers on payments 
and payment systems and was established in the mid 
1980s. APACS ceased to exist on 6 July 2009 but has 
been replaced by the UK Cards Association. A report by 
APACS [19] detailed that CNP fraud was valued at £328.4 
million in 2008; this was a rise of 13% on the previous 
12 months. CNP fraud involves the theft of genuine card 
details that are then used to make a purchase over the 
Internet, by telephone, or by mail order. The cardholder 
is usually unaware of this fraud until they check their 
statement and this gives the criminal opportunity to 
receive goods or services and use them or sell them on 
before the crime is even detected. CNP is the largest 
type of card fraud in the UK and accounts for more than 
half of all card fraud losses.
It should be noted that while CNP fraud has risen over 
time, so too have the shopping habits of consumers, 
and as such the year on year increase should not be 
a surprise. From 2000 to 2008 CNP fraud rose by 350 
per cent; however over the same period, the total value 
of online shopping increased by 1077 per cent. In 2008 
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online shopping accounted for £41.2 billion compared 
to the much more modest £3.5 billion in 2000.
Whilst it can be reasoned as to why there may be such a 
large number of investigations regarding the retail sector, 
the statistic should be viewed with some caution. The 
number of organisations in the retail sector is a significant 
proportion of UK organisations and as such, it would be 
expected to feature highly in any report on investigations. 
It should also be noted that losses from a large number 
of retail organisations may not necessarily be as high in 
value as a single loss from a company in the financial 
sector nor indeed from a manufacturing company 
which has lost intellectual property of significant value. 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that there has been 
an increase in the number of investigations of breaches 
suffered by organisations in the financial sector. This may 
represent an actual increase in the number of breaches, 
but it is important to note, that a substantial number of 
breaches may have been experienced for some time, 
but the investigation of these breaches kept internal. 
Companies in the financial sector are often particularly 
susceptible to volatile share prices that are elastic to 
confidence in the services they offer. As such, they 
prefer to keep details of, or indeed existence of, breaches 
out of public awareness and employ internal teams. A 
recent research paper has summarised the situation 
quite well:
“The absence of a breach notification is not the same as 
the absence of a breach. An undetected breach cannot 
be reported. A compromise that is detected internally may 
not be communicated to the larger public, either because 
the likelihood of a threat having exploited a vulnerability 
is deemed too unlikely, or because the organization 
 
 
determines that it would rather accept the consequences 
of a lack of disclosure than the additional expenditure 
that might result from publicizing a compromise. Though 
breach notices provide imperfect information” [20]
It may be that these organisations are now outsourcing 
more of these investigations which would lead to a rise 
in the number of investigations undertaken by external 
agencies. It should be noted that it is also likely that the 
number of attacks against those in the financial sector is 
likely to have risen itself, and in the data used for this study, 
the second-most investigated sector was financial. It has 
been reported publicly that some financial organisations 
were victims to sophisticated attacks in 2008. 
Beyond the retail and financial sectors, there were a 
wide number of different sectors that were investigated 
after breaches including councils, health, hospitality, 
IT services, marketing, metal trade, postal and sports; 
some of the organisations investigated had multiple 
businesses across different sectors. 
The organisations for which data has been gathered 
for this report can also be categorised using Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. The SIC system is 
used for classifying business activities in the UK and is 
bound, by European legislation, to the European Union’s 
industrial classification system, NACE (Nomenclature 
Générale des Activités Économiques dans les 
Communautés Européennes). The SIC and NACE codes 
systems are most widely used for statistical analysis by 
authorities and statistical bodies. There have been three 
different versions of SIC codes, the first in 1992 which 
were revised in 2003 before forming the basis for the 
UK 2007 SIC system. The changes have largely been 
due to refinements due to changes in services offered 
in the area of technology, particularly information and 
communications technology.
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FIGURE 1
ORGANISATION BY INDUSTRY TYPE
The development of the system has involved a number 
of stakeholders such as the European Commission, 
the National Statistical Institutes of EU member states, 
European Business and Trade associations, the Bank 
of England as well as a number of UK Government 
departments.
The organisations that have been investigated are 
presented by the SIC codes in Table 1. This demonstrates 
the wide range of primary SIC codes for the organisations 
of this study.
Type of oganisation based on industry type.
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SIC CODES 
2007 SIC Code Classification Name
Number of 
Occurrences
47910 Internet retail sales (retail) 41
66190 Financial transactions centre 3
62012 Business and domestic software development 1
96040 Spas 1
62020 Information technology consultancy activities 1
16230 Fencing made of wood (assembled) (manufacture) 1
64929 Finance corporation for industry 1
24420 Aluminium alloys production (manufacture) 1
62012 Web page design 1
63110 Web hosting 1
73200 Market research agency 1
93120 Football clubs 1
84110 Local Government administration 1
55201
Holiday and other short stay accommodation, provided in holiday centres 
and holiday villages
1
65120 Motor insurance 1
82990 Luncheon voucher company 1
55100 Hotel (licensed with restaurant) 1
24100 Engineering steel (manufacture) 1
77110 Car hire (self drive) 1
93199 Rugby league 1
Organisation industry type by SIC classification.
TABLE 1
STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION CODES
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number of emPloyees In  
the organIsatIon 
FIGURE 2
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES IN THE ORGANISATION 
The organisations used to comprise this report vary 
widely in size. The vast majority of organisations that 
were investigated had between 1-100 employees. It has 
been widely reported that as the motives of attackers has 
moved from vandalism to financial gain, so too has the 
target of those attacks. 
Many of the attacks primarily aimed at vandalism would 
have been at the largest companies, so as to cause 
maximum disruption, but when attacking for financial 
 
 
 
 
gain the strategy changes. Attackers will now consider 
a simple return on investment argument along with an 
appropriate risk analysis. With larger companies investing 
more in security and incident response, the great returns 
from an attack require more effort and carry a greater 
risk than undertaking multiple attacks against smaller 
companies.
Number of Employees in the Organisation
Number of employees in the organisations investigated.
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Types of Data Stolen
As has been mentioned it is important, but often difficult, 
to ascertain exactly what data has been compromised. 
In the cases investigated the vast majority involved 
payment card data being lost or leaked; payment 
card data was compromised in 85% of the cases.  
This can be attributed to the fact that the data is in a 
readily available and useable form. It can lead to financial 
gain with very little effort and this is of great attraction to 
cybercriminals looking for a rapid return on their effort. 
FIGURE 3
TYPES OF DATA STOLEN
Types of data stolen from the organisations investigated.
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FIGURE 4
NUMBER OF CARDS AT RISK
Where payment cards were at risk, the range of card numbers involved varied, with the most common being 
between 20,000 and 50,000, across all investigations.
0-1000 7 14%
1000-2000 4 8%
2000-5000 5 10%
5000-10000 6 12%
10000-20000 8 16%
20000-50000 9 18%
50000-100000 4 8%
100000-500000 6 12%
500000+ 1 2%
0% 
2% 
4% 
6% 
8% 
10% 
12% 
14% 
16% 
18% 
0-1000 
1000-2000 
2000-5000 
5000-10000 
10000-20000 
20000-50000 
50000-100000 
100000-500000 
500000+ 
14% 
8% 
10% 
12% 
16% 
18% 
8% 
12% 
2% 
Number of payment cards at risk across all the investigations 
Cardholder records at risk.
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The Source of Breaches 
As with any crime there are a number of questions to 
be answered. One of the important questions is who 
committed the crime. This is needed for a number of 
reasons, but most notably to ensure that justice is 
served. Unfortunately this is not always possible, and is 
often the case in electronic crimes. Criminals can use 
techniques to cover their tracks, spoof their identities 
and their locations. 
It is a well-known problem in information security and 
forensic analysis that even when a particular piece of 
equipment can be tracked with absolute certainty to be 
the source of a crime, proving the specific perpetrator is 
non-trivial. This is even the case when the machine can 
be proved to belong to an individual, or a password is 
used, or even after an analysis of other interactions with 
the machine is performed. However, it is the role of the 
forensic investigator to ascertain as much information 
regarding the identity of the perpetrator as possible, and 
potentially give evidence in court to help determine beyond 
reasonable doubt whether the accused is responsible.
An early fact that investigators consider is where the attack 
originated in relation to the organisational structure. That 
is, to establish whether the attack was internal, external 
or through a business partner. This can also be used to 
identify trends and which threats are actually realised. 
It is such information that can inform the assessment 
of the risk and associated loss as well as the strategy 
for recovery and prevention of further breaches through 
similar attacks.
It should be noted that the source of an attack is 
recognised to be closely correlated with industry, 
and this may be for a variety of reasons. For 
example, all attacks on financial organisations were 
from external sources; this could be explained by 
recruitment policies or regulation within that sector. 
Internal sources are those that originate from within the 
organisation itself. This would typically be the staff in the 
organisation and is not restricted simply to those in an 
IT department but all staff from the board through end 
users of IT systems to cleaners and maintenance staff, 
and indeed the work experience student in the office for 
only a few weeks. It should be noted that as well as the 
staffing aspect of an organisation, internal sources will 
include physical assets such as paper based information 
that can be used to assist in a breach or information 
systems on the premises that are open. Insider threats 
can be particularly devastating as all insiders will have 
some level of privilege and trust, and some insiders have 
very high levels of both.
External sources are those that originate outside the 
organisation and are attributable to a person or group of 
people that have no relationship with the organisation. 
These are often in the categories of hackers, organised 
crime groups, and Government entities. Being external 
to the organisation, the levels of both privilege and trust 
will be minimal in most cases (though unfortunately this 
may not be true in certain cases.) 
Business Partners are any people or groups that have 
a business relationship with the company. These third 
parties may be in the same, vertical or horizontal sectors 
to the organisation and will include, but not be limited 
to, suppliers, customers and contractors. Since most 
business partners are chosen and in some way controlled, 
they and their associated staff do enjoy some level of 
trust and privilege. However, since the recruitment and 
development of staff is not directly controlled (nor indeed 
might the contractors chosen by a business partner be 
approved) the level of privilege and trust is generally 
lower than that of an internal member of staff. 
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A weakness in the business partner scenario is that if an 
attacker compromises the partner and then uses trusted 
connections to access the victim, it will appear to the 
victim that the attacker is actually the trusted business 
partner and as such will have access to all the data that 
would be available to that partner. 
The forensic investigators at 7Safe have determined what 
the primary source of a breach is. A source is considered 
a primary source of a breach if it was the most significant 
reason behind an attack. 
As can be seen the majority of attacks in this study were 
from external sources. Indeed the number of attacks that 
were down to internal sources is a very small minority. 
This may seem counterintuitive to some observers, and 
indeed may contradict some survey data in other reports. 
For example the third edition of the Global Security Survey 
for the Technology, Media & Telecommunications (TMT) 
industry, found that 41% of respondents experienced at 
least one internal security breach in the 12 months leading 
up to the survey. Indeed only 28% of respondents rated 
themselves as “very confident” or “extremely confident” 
with regard to internal threats, down from 51% in their 
2008 survey. [21]
It is not claimed and should not be assumed that the actual 
proportion of breaches that are due to internal sources is 
consistently this small; we can only report on the cases 
undertaken by the 7Safe forensic investigation team. 
FIGURE 5
SOURCE OF BREACH
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The data analysis shows that 18% of breaches were 
primarily due to business partners. This highlights a 
concern that is often left from consideration but is of 
importance. It is critical that companies recognise the 
lack of control they have over business partners. They 
need to be aware that some of the arrangements their 
partners have with other external organisations may allow 
full access to all information held by the partner, and by 
transition therefore have access to information of the 
original company. This has been seen in more than one 
case that 7Safe has investigated. 
Given the sheer volume of attacks that originate 
from hackers, it is important for forensic analysts 
to determine the techniques employed. Using this 
information is of great benefit to information security 
officers that can then ensure hardening of the 
systems against future attacks. The cases examined 
by the 7Safe forensic investigation team show the 
predominant vulnerabilities exploited were in poorly 
written website applications, and in particular, by SQL 
injection and malware attacks. 
In the study 40% of all attacks utilised SQL injection as 
the source of the compromise with an additional 20% 
on top using SQL injection combined with another 
vulnerability such as malware (see figure 8). The 
SQL injection vulnerability is a common weakness in 
many systems as can be seen with 60% of the cases 
suffering from it leading to the compromise. However, 
it is surprising given the amount of information known 
about the attack and ways to prevent it that so many 
systems are still susceptible to it. SQL injection 
attacks take advantage of poor coding practice in 
applications and web interfaces by exploiting a failure 
to properly handle user input. It could be argued that 
in complex applications and live systems it can be 
difficult and costly to repair all flaws that result from 
failure to validate SQL input. However, this must be 
the responsibility of the information security analysts, 
and they are only equipped with finite resources and 
a growing numbers of potential threats. The fact that 
many compromises come from SQL injection attacks 
can only help inform the decisions that an information 
security strategist makes. This heightened risk can be 
used in a risk assessment to produce a cost-benefit 
analysis. Estimating the cost for this analysis will rely 
on estimating the cost of repair to existing systems, 
and the extra protection afforded. This may become 
increasingly difficult as SQL injection attacks become 
more sophisticated. A large proportion of the breaches 
involved attacks on web interfaces and it is clear that 
this presents a major security risk for organisations. 
The benefits of allowing access to data via a web 
interface is clear, however the advantage must be 
weighed in the face of the risk. In some cases the 
advantages will outweigh the risk of data loss; in other 
cases it will not. It is for this reason that it is vital that 
access to data through the web for remote working 
must be customised and carefully planned. Access 
should be limited to those that specifically require 
it, and the information allowed should be strictly 
that necessary to allow effective remote working. 
SQL injection attacks are unlikely to be affected by 
such policies, but by considering access to data, it is 
possible to segregate data so that if a web server is 
compromised it is physically and logically separated 
from other corporate or customer information. 
the source of breaches
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FIGURE 6
ENvIRONMENT UNDER ATTACK 
One of the ever-increasing sources of compromise 
is the exploitation through shared web space or web 
hosting. The dangers of shared hosting environments 
are as simple as an attacker compromising one website 
using malware or SQL injection, thus having the ability 
to compromise all websites on that hosting server 
using the same vulnerability. This is often seen in 
investigations carried out by 7Safe and the majority of 
the cases undertaken (46%) involve a shared hosting 
environment being hacked. 
Malware continues to be an area of concern for 
those responsible for protecting information systems. 
Whereas historically the motivation for creating and 
distributing malware may have tended towards 
disruption or vandalism, financial gain is now clearly 
the main motivation. The average medium-sized 
organisation has been reported to experience five 
malware attacks per year and has seen threat levels 
increase each year.
The environment compromised that stored or processed the data at risk.
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Infrastructure vs Application
Another interesting trend is the increased proportion 
of website applications being targeted for attack rather 
than the infrastructure it is hosted upon. The data 
used for this study shows that in 86% of all attacks, a 
weakness in a web interface was exploited.  (see figure 
7) . A likely reason for this is the inherent availability 
of websites versus that of its hosted infrastructure 
(including operating systems, hardware devices etc.). 
The reward of exploitation is often also more apparent. 
For example, an ecommerce website is clearly going to 
be processing cardholder data and be of a known higher 
value than a random IP address of a server on which 
the data may or may not be of any value to the attacker.  
FIGURE 7
INFRASTRUCTURE vS APPLICATION
Areas of the compromised systems exploited.
Infrastructure 9 14%
Web Application 53 86%
Infrastructure 14% 
Web Application 86% 
16
the source of breaches
Exploited Vulnerabilities 
The most common cause of the compromises 
investigated are shown in figure 8.  The main 
vulnerability exploited is SQL injection, with a 
notable increase in the rise in attacks using 
malicious software or malware being apparent over 
the course of the investigations during the study 
period. Commonly used malware in the form of ‘web 
shells’ has been seen in a high number of recent 
cases. This is most likely due to the simplicity of 
the infection into a website system. All the attacker 
requires is the ability to upload a file, be it from 
a Curriculum vitae up-loader, an image uploader 
or a website authoring tool.  The attacker doesn’t 
even require the knowledge of how the web shell 
is written or how to code it, as it’s simply a case of 
point and click. These web shells are often very well 
coded and quite complex in their functionality, but 
are freely available on the web and are ready to use 
on any vulnerable website.
Often SQL injection is used to facilitate the malware 
attacks. In recent cases investigated, SQL injection 
can be seen used to exploit and steal database 
usernames and passwords. The attackers then 
simply use these stolen credentials to access the 
administration interface of the website and use the 
built-in image upload facility to infect the site with 
the web shell, and start stealing data.
Poor server configuration describes a mis-configured 
server or one that has services running that has 
not been set up correctly. In the cases investigated 
there were many instances where administrator and 
user credentials were very weak or easily guessable; 
allowing an attacker to brute force the account to 
gain a foothold onto the system. In one instance, the 
attacker compromised a default known user account 
and logged onto the server using the remote desktop 
connection facility, and compromised the system. In 
this case the username was Guest and so was the 
password. The lack of protective equipment such 
as firewalls or hardware virtual private networks 
(vPNs) were also contributory factors to these types 
of attacks. Either they were not present or they were 
not configured correctly to prevent an attack.
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vULNERABILITY LEADING TO DATA COMPROMISE
FIGURE 8
Vulnerability or exploit used to compromise the system. 
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Attack Sophistication 
The sophistication of an attack is almost always a 
direct indicator of the difficulty of attack (since most 
attackers will choose the simplest way to break into a 
system). The difficulty of the attack can then, in turn, 
be considered an indication of the strength of the 
system under attack. The difficulty of the attack also 
demonstrates how much effort an attacker is prepared 
to go to in order to compromise the system in question. 
Classifying the level of sophistication is subjective and 
the experience of 7Safe forensic investigators has 
been used to classify the sophistication of the attacks. 
Simple: No specialist skills or resources are required to 
conduct a simple attack. Basic computer operation skills 
are required. 
 
Average: This requires only basic tools without 
modification or knowledge. Many of the tools will be freely 
available from general Internet sites with high levels of 
automation. People using such tools are sometimes 
termed ‘script kiddies’. 
Sophisticated: Advanced skills and knowledge, often in 
the areas of programming and operating systems, are 
required for sophisticated attacks. Such attacks normally 
require a level of preparatory work and involve a staged 
attack over a period of time. 
FIGURE 9
COMPLExITY OF ATTACK
attack soPhIstIcatIon
Complexity of the attacks investigated.
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Attack Origin 
Only 13% of the attacks on UK-based organisations 
appeared to come from the UK itself, with the majority 
emanating from the vietnam and the US. The law in 
vietnam during the study period was such that vietnamese 
citizens could not be prosecuted for committing computer 
crime against foreign countries.
An important note when analysing these statistics is that 
they have assumed that the last IP address identified is 
the source IP address of the attacker. It is possible that the 
attacker could have compromised a computer in another 
country (or indeed a series in several locations) and used 
this as the final hop into the victim organisation. 
7Safe’s forensic investigation team does not have the legal 
authority to investigate the apparent source of attack and 
beyond. However, on particular high profile cases, 7Safe 
has worked with the relevant law enforcement agencies to 
pursue these lines of enquiry.
Many of the attacks are conducted in such a way that 
there is no trace of the attacker’s IP address stored 
on the server and therefore their potential location is 
unknown. Also a large number of investigations have been 
conducted on servers on which log files were not present, 
not configured to be stored, or corrupted. Many system 
administrators and web designers do not see the value in 
enabling logging on their servers due to the potential high 
amount of disk space required. 
However, it is also apparent that some hosting companies 
also limit the amount of log files stored by default, e.g. 
for one week. Therefore, this highlights the need to act 
fast in engaging a forensic Incident Response team such 
as 7Safe’s in order to preserve the best evidence for the 
investigation.
FIGURE 10
ATTACK COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
USA 29% Vietnam 36%
Singapore 3%
Ukraine 3%
Indonesia 3%
Russia 6% Germany 7%
UK 13%
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PCI DSS Compliance 
There are a number of data security standards to which 
organisations should comply with, depending on the 
circumstances in which they operate. These include 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (often referred to as SOx), 
Basel II, Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) and the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). 
One of the most important is that developed by the 
Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council (PCI 
SSC), “an open global forum for the ongoing development, 
enhancement, storage, dissemination and implementation 
of security standards for account data protection.” (https://
www.pcisecuritystandards.org) 
Founded on 15 December 2004, the mission of the PCI 
SSC is to enhance payment account data security through 
education and awareness of the Payment Card Industry 
Data Security Standards (PCI DSS). American Express, 
Discover Financial Services, JCB International, MasterCard 
Worldwide, and visa, Inc founded the PCI SSC.
Organisations that store, process or transmit cardholder 
data and fail to comply with the PCI DSS face the risk of 
not being allowed to handle cardholder data and fines if 
the data is lost or stolen. 
A large number of the breach investigations undertaken 
by 7Safe included the compromise of cardholder data, 
which encompasses credit and debit card numbers 
(‘primary account numbers’), card security codes and 
other account information such as cardholder name, 
expiration date etc. 
There are twelve requirements of the PCI DSS within 
six categories. The requirements each contribute in 
different ways to ensuring the protection of data and the 
subsequent impact of any breach. Upon investigations 
where cardholder data was compromised, the 7Safe 
team checked compliance with each requirement of 
the PCI DSS. 
These categories and requirements are presented below, 
along with the results of the analysis.
Build and Maintain a Secure Network 
Requirement 1: Install and maintain a firewall 
configuration to protect cardholder data 
Requirement 1 is defined to ensure that access to and 
from a network is authorised. Firewalls can be software 
programs, hardware devices, or combinations of both 
and are generally used to monitor the information coming 
through an Internet connection into a computer system. 
It is vital that only authorised access is given to the 
cardholder data environment. This issue however does not 
only relate to Internet connections but must also consider 
segmenting access from other untrusted networks, 
including wireless networks. 
Whilst many of the organisations investigated actually had 
firewalls installed, poor configuration of these devices 
rendered most of them useless. In over 96% of cases, 
requirement 1 of PCI DSS was not adequately adhered to.
Requirement 2: Do not use vendor-supplied 
defaults for system passwords and other security 
parameters 
Although this would seem rather an obvious security 
measure, it is surprisingly one that many organisations 
simply failed to comply with. A staggering 81% of the 
breached organisations had not changed the system 
defaults throughout their cardholder data environment, 
including default router configurations, MS Windows 
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guest accounts, shopping cart and website 
administration interface passwords. Additionally a 
point of failure is leaving the wireless systems set with 
the default SSIDs or WEP keys and not encrypting 
console access. Most organisations also had more 
than one primary function per server.
The continued use of default passwords may be due 
to laziness or ignorance, and comprehensive lists 
of these can be easily found on numerous hacker 
community web sites.
Even Gary McKinnon, when facing trial for unauthorised 
access into USA agency and Government systems, stated, 
“It was child’s play to get into US military systems. Many 
were using blank or default passwords to access their 
servers’ Netbios operating system.”
Protect Cardholder Data 
Requirement 3: Protect stored cardholder data 
To protect stored data, it is vital that organisations make use 
of protection methods such as encryption, truncation and 
hashing. Should someone manage to gain unauthorised 
access into a system, providing that sufficiently strong 
encryption is in place and that the keys and passwords 
are not stored (logically) nearby, the data is unreadable 
and of little use to that person. An important aim of this 
requirement is to stop merchants storing the card security 
code post-authentication.
Over 96% of the organisations that had cardholder data 
compromised failed to meet this requirement, mainly due 
to the storing of the card security code after the transaction 
was authorised.
Requirement 4: Encrypt transmission of 
cardholder data across open, public networks
Another important requirement of the PCI DSS is that 
sensitive cardholder information must be encrypted 
during transmission over networks that can be accessed 
by malicious individuals. 
Almost 64% of organisations had ensured acceptable 
encryption of data over public networks. Although this 
is not a very high percentage, it was the most widely 
adhered to security requirement of all the 12 PCI DSS 
requirements.
This requirement encompasses not only communications 
to and from web sites (e.g. online retail accepting card 
payments), but also other areas such as wireless networks, 
chat and email.
Maintain a Vulnerability Management 
Program 
Requirement 5: Use and regularly update anti-
virus software on all systems commonly affected 
by malware.
Only 29% of the organisations that suffered a breach of 
cardholder data maintained up-to-date anti-virus software 
on relevant systems, and in many cases there was no 
antivirus installed. In most cases PCs in office systems 
were protected by a form of anti-virus, but the majority of 
website hosting servers were not protected at all.
The most common reason given for this was the risk of 
degrading the server’s performance if anti-virus was 
installed.
The main problem here is the most likely place where 
malware could be used to compromise sensitive data is a 
server rather than a desktop PC.
Requirement 6: Develop and maintain secure 
systems and applications 
Regular patching of programs and operating systems is 
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a vital aspect of ensuring the security of systems. There 
are well-known websites that report vulnerabilities in 
software, applications and operating systems. These are 
often accompanied with exploits of the vulnerability. With 
such information being freely available it is important that 
organisations regularly protect and update systems. PCI 
DSS states that “all critical systems must have the most 
recently released, appropriate software patches to protect 
against exploitation and compromise of cardholder data by 
malicious individuals and malicious software.” A significant 
issue highlighted with patching and updating systems 
particularly in a Windows environment is the necessity 
to reboot the server to complete the update. Therefore, 
causing downtime and potential loss of earnings. 
The failure of 100% of the breached organisations to 
comply with requirement 6 is one of the most telling. 
Not one of the organisations that suffered a compromise 
of cardholder data had systems and applications that 
could be considered secure. Further, in 60% of these, 
applications vulnerable to SQL injection were used 
directly or indirectly as part of the successful attack. In 
31% of cases, malicious scripts known as web shells were 
uploaded to gain access to web servers (often via SQL 
injection). An often overlooked part to this requirement 
is that generally web developers fail to update their web 
sites, shopping carts or hosting platforms.
Implement Strong Access Control 
Measures 
Requirement 7: Restrict access to cardholder 
data by business need-to-know 
As mentioned in the discussion of requirement 3, 
encryption can serve as a great protector of data, but it 
does not replace the need for only storing information 
that is necessary. Requirement 7 then considers that 
once data is stored, an effective access control policy is 
in place. Authorisation is increasingly important to both 
minimise risks of a data compromise, and analysis of 
the cause of a breach after an event has taken place. 
The requirement is designed to ensure that sensitive 
data can only be accessed by authorised personnel. It 
requires that systems and processes must be in place to 
limit access based on need-to-know and according to job 
responsibilities.
Of the organisations that suffered a compromise of 
cardholder data, just under 31% restricted access to 
cardholder data on a business need-to-know basis. 
Of the cases where the source of the breach was found 
to come from either inside the organisation itself or from 
a business partner, 75% of these organisations failed to 
restrict access in accordance with this requirement.
Requirement 8: Assign a unique ID to each 
person with computer access 
To assist in any investigation after a breach, the assignment 
of a unique ID to each person with access ensures access 
to data can be traced to known and authorised users. It 
also ensures that each user is aware that they are held 
uniquely accountable for his or her actions. 
In over 96% of these cases where cardholder data was 
compromised, computer access was found to be shared 
by more than one person who used the same user ID. 
In some cases, where there were different IDs used, the 
same password was used by every person within the 
organisation.
Requirement 9: Restrict physical access to 
cardholder data 
Enforcing restrictions on physical access to the cardholder 
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data or systems that house cardholder data is another 
requirement of the PCI DSS. Physical access could 
otherwise provide an opportunity for individuals to access 
devices or data and to remove systems or hard copies.
The requirement to restrict physical access to these 
systems was met in just over 25% of investigations where 
cardholder data was breached.
The basic intent for this control like all the other controls 
in the standard is to maintain confidentiality. Although 
the majority of breached organisations did maintain tight 
perimeter physical access, most failed to realise the extent 
of where cardholder data actually was (i.e. the cardholder 
data was found to be distributed beyond where they 
thought it was). 
Data classification and distribution to or through 
third party providers and staff needs to be included 
in the physical security due diligence practices. This 
is particularly important for merchants spanning 
geographical areas where cardholder data is maintained 
in paper form. This generally gets redistributed through 
various means including couriers, email and fax. 
 
Regularly Monitor and Test Networks 
Requirement 10: Track and monitor all access 
to network resources and cardholder data 
By tracking and monitoring activity on, and access 
to, network resources and cardholder data, unusual 
behaviours and anomalies can be alerted and 
thus potentially prevent a breach. If a breach 
has occurred, this information can also prove 
invaluable for detection, investigation and damage 
limitation. Determining the cause of a breach is 
significantly more difficult without system activity logs. 
 
Of the organisations that suffered cardholder data 
compromises, none of them had adequately tracked 
& monitored all access to network resources and 
cardholder data. 
This requirement is crucial for ensuring that measurement 
tools exist for controlling and evaluating confidentiality. 
Generally speaking, the organisations mostly only 
configured logging to capture OS-related functions and 
forgot to configure the applications associated with the 
cardholder  data environment. Any application or system 
component involved in any service or transaction process 
capable of generating logs must be included to meet 
compliance. Antivirus events, web server logs, database logs 
and payment application logs all fall under the scope for 
PCI-DSS and should be able to produce a full audit trail.
Requirement 11: Regularly test security systems 
and processes 
New vulnerabilities that impact security are being 
discovered continually by both researchers and malicious 
individuals. The race is always on between those testing 
systems with honourable intentions, and those with 
dishonourable intentions. 
Commonly, when a vulnerability in a system or program is 
found by those serving good, it is published so that a fix 
can be provided. 
System components, processes, and custom software 
should be tested frequently to ensure security controls 
continue to reflect a changing environment.
As with requirement 10, none of the breached 
organisations that suffered a breach of cardholder 
data had ever formally tested their security 
systems or processes to the required standard. 
The fact that 100% of the organisations had 
never conducted thorough penetration testing can 
hardly come as a surprise for obvious reasons. 
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Maintain an Information Security Policy 
Requirement 12: Maintain a policy that addresses 
information security
Clearly, security policies are important to inform employees 
what is expected of them. All employees should be 
aware of the sensitivity and value of data and be fully 
appreciative of their responsibilities for protecting it. 
 
The term employees for the purposes of this requirement 
of PCI-DSS, refers to full-time and part-time employees, 
temporary employees and personnel, and contractors 
and consultants who are “resident” on the company’s 
site. In almost all (over 98%) cases investigated where the 
organisations suffered a breach of cardholder data, there 
was no adequate information security policy as required 
by the PCI DSS. 
FIGURE 11
PCI DSS COMPLIANCE
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The percentage of individual PCI DSS Requirements met overall by organisations suffering cardholder data breaches.
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Prior to having suffered a cardholder data compromise, 
26% of the organisations had believed themselves to 
be PCI DSS compliant upon submission of completed 
Self Assessment Questionnaires. The investigations 
also revealed that none of the organisations met all 
requirements of the PCI DSS. Indeed, in just over one 
quarter of the cases, none of the twelve requirements 
were met. The maximum number of requirements met 
by an individual organisation was only 6 out of 12, in 
approximately 4% of cases.
None of the organisations that had satisfied the 
requirements of PCI DSS Approved Scan vendor (ASv) 
vulnerability scanning were sufficiently protected to 
prevent against being compromised by a combination of 
attacks that such scanning is purported to detect. ASv 
scanning is an automated, computer driven task that 
does not involve human interpretation of results. 
An analogy may assist in describing the shortfalls of 
automated vulnerability scanning. Let us assume that a 
burglar creates a robot that identifies houses which are 
easy targets for the burglar to subsequently break into. 
The robot is programmed to go to the front door of each 
house, check to see if the door is unlocked, and if it is 
locked, to look under the door mat for a key. 
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FIGURE 12
PCI DSS COMPLIANCE
The total number of PCI DSS requirements met (out of a maximum of 12) by the organisations  
suffering cardholder data breaches. 
26
The robot sets off around the neighbourhood and comes 
across the first house, tries to open the door but it is 
locked. It then follows the next instruction which is to 
check under the doormat, but there is no key there. The 
house is therefore marked as not vulnerable. However, 
the key was actually sitting on top of the door mat, right 
in front of the robot, but because the robot was not 
programmed to deal with this, it missed it.
In this analogy the robot is like the vulnerability scanner, 
an automated program that will provide some level of 
checking for vulnerabilities, but with shortfalls. The 
criminal hackers who break into organisations are not 
robots and, like the burglar, would have noticed the key 
sitting there on top of the door mat. This is of course 
the reason that penetration tests and technical security 
assessments are carried out by humans.
A common problem found by 7Safe is that an ASv 
scanner is not “intelligent” enough to sign up or log 
into website customer user areas. For example an ASv 
scanner will check for vulnerabilities on the pages it can 
access at that time. However, a human conducting the 
test may notice that there is a page that allows them to 
enter details and log in to further pages not accessible 
to the ASv scanner. These pages may be the vulnerable 
ones that allow them to upload their malicious web shells 
and then steal data.
A significant reason to a merchant not being PCI 
compliant is not the unwillingness on the merchant’s side, 
but more the lack of understanding and interpretation of 
the PCI DSS. Often what is needed is a review of the 
systems by a technically knowledgeable person with a 
good understanding of the PCI DSS requirements.
7Safe has found that all the merchants who have been 
subject to a breach and have completed an ASv scan 
have believed themselves to be secure based solely on 
the results of this scan, therefore, putting themselves 
into a false state of security. ASv scanning should 
not be relied upon in isolation. Further tests, scans 
and processes should be adopted and used to help 
understand, locate and prevent the common website 
vulnerabilities. 7Safe offers these services to their 
merchant customers and finds that once the merchant 
understands that the automated scan is different to a 
trained security consultant using their intelligence and 
experience to penetration test the website, then more 
can be done to help secure the website and prevent 
further attack.
PcI dss comPlIance
27
Conclusions
This report provides detailed information through 
the analysis of real and current information security 
breaches. 
The analysis clearly reveals that there are certain areas 
that organisations are commonly found to be neglecting. 
The high percentage of insecure web applications and 
susceptibility to SQL injection and malware demonstrates 
a widespread lack of understanding about these subjects 
and highlights the need for educating software developers 
about preventative measures. 
In addition, merchants should take further steps to 
protect their web server environments, conduct security 
testing and also ask questions of their web developers/
hosting companies who often state that their website has 
been written securely.
The data also suggests a strong link between security 
breaches and the absence of thorough security auditing 
(notably penetration testing and security assessments). 
The inherent limitations of automated vulnerability 
assessment tools (that often misrepresent the true state 
of security of a web site or server) have been clearly 
highlighted.
The large number of breaches suffered by online 
retailers can be explained by the potentially lucrative 
reward of payment card details. Crime has evolved onto 
the Internet. It may be easier for a criminal to hack into 
a web server and steal thousands of credit card details 
and from a hidden location on the Internet, than to steal 
a purse or a wallet from a vulnerable person to gain 
some cash and maybe one or two credit card numbers. 
The risk versus reward has changed dramatically. 
The analysis proves that many organisations who 
declare themselves compliant with the PCI Data 
Security Standards are not even close. There is often 
an overwhelming amount of information to comprehend 
when it comes to PCI and information security for the 
average lay person. This is completely understandable 
also; these subjects require very specialist knowledge 
that is changing on a daily basis, and to expect every 
ecommerce merchant to understand all points that PCI 
and information security requires of them without any 
assistance is going to result in further data security 
breaches occurring. 7Safe’s information security 
consultants are often asked to support clients who have 
concerns over the security of  their data. This can range 
from PCI DSS, security assessments, penetration testing 
and education. 
It often falls to the IT Managers and Information Security 
specialists to implement the technical controls to protect 
commercially sensitive information. 
However, effective information security has a wider 
remit than that of the IT Manager / Security Specialist. 
It is the experience of 7Safe that those organisations 
whose Executive level drives information security as 
a company-wide managed project are also the most 
successful in the implementation of effective controls. 
Therefore we recommend that Company Executives use 
this report as a catalyst for initiating a review of company 
wide information security practice and analysis of gaps. 
IT Managers and Security Specialists should use this 
report to generate effective business cases to support 
remediation proposals. 
The combined approach of Executive driven, business-
led programmes implemented by technically skilled 
professionals provides a powerful reply to the constant 
threat to the security of information. 
conclusIons
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